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Abstract
Conventional theory assumes that economic agents perform at optimal levels of 
efficiency by definition and this is achieved when individuals behave in a particu-
lar fashion. Moreover, neoclassical production theory masks the process by which 
optimal output can be achieved. I argue that economic theory should be revised to 
incorporate some key findings of behavioural economics, while retaining the con-
ventional theory’s normative ideal of optimum output whilst rejecting its normative 
procedural ideals of how to achieve optimality in production. I argue that neoclas-
sical procedures can be expected to yield sub-optimal levels of output and therefore 
should not be benchmarks for procedural rationality. I present an alternative more 
realistic and analytically precise specification of the production function related to 
the fast and frugal heuristics narrative pioneered by Gigerenzer and Leibenstein’s 
x-efficient theory. This approach incorporates an understanding of the appropriate 
procedures, psychological and organization variables, decision-making capabilities 
and end-goals required to achieve optimality in production and, thereby, grow the 
wealth of nations, thereby enhancing the material wellbeing of the population at 
large. This also provides us with the tools to better identify economic inefficiency 
and the conditions that contribute to it.
Keywords Bounded rationality · x-efficiency · Fast and frugal heuristics · Effort 
variability · Satisficing · Decision-making · Agency
This article extends from some of my previous research on behavioural economics, rationality in 
decision making and ‘rational inefficiency’ in production and consumption. It also builds upon 
the contributions of Gerd Gigerenzer and Vernon Smith on behavioural economics and ecological 
rationality and Harvey Leibenstein’s x-efficiency theory. This article is a by-product of presentations 
of related papers presented at the Max Planck in Berlin. Thanks are owed to Nathan Berg, Gerd 
Gigerenzer, and Shabnam Mousavi. I also thank Hannah Altman and Louise Lamontagne for their 
comments suggestions on this article.
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1 Introduction
There is a consensus amongst behavioural economists that decision-makers often 
deviate from the behavioural norms identified as optimal by conventional (neo-clas-
sical) economics in both the domain of consumption and production, with a more 
recent focus on consumption. The focus of this article is on choice behaviour inside 
of the firm. Conventional economics typically maintains that decision-makers not 
only should but do behave in a manner consistent with the neoclassical norms for 
optimal behaviour. This behaviour ultimately results in economic efficiency. More 
specifically it is maintained that economic agents within the firm are behaving as if 
they are optimizing thereby maximizing profits and minimizing average production 
costs (Altman 1999; Friedman 1953). Any other behaviour (such as the use of heu-
ristics—decision-making shortcuts) would see the firm decimated by market forces. 
Moreover, non-optimizing behaviour would not be rational (where rationality is 
defined as including, as a necessary condition, optimizing behaviour). And irration-
ality of this type is ruled out, by assumption, by the conventional wisdom.
But the facts suggest otherwise. What actually transpires in the black box of the 
firm often is persistent sub-optimal behaviour. The firm is not as productive as it 
might otherwise be given the traditional inputs into the firm’s production function. 
Or, when firms are performing efficiently or optimally this is not necessarily consist-
ent with firm members adhering to the optimal conventional behavioural norms of 
conventional economic theory, where the latter I refer to as rational or smart behav-
iour. What conventional economics recognizes is the type of economic inefficiency 
that is given ‘exogenously’ by market structure, referred to as allocative inefficiency. 
This is a function of distorted market prices relative some competitive ideal. This 
conventional type of inefficiency tends to be relatively trivial. But another type of 
inefficiency, referred to as x-inefficiency by Leibenstein, in his classic 1966 article, 
appears to be quite important when analysts bother to test for its substantive signifi-
cance (Frantz 1997; Tong 2020). X-inefficiency is defined as not being as productive 
as possible given traditional factor inputs. Being as productive as possible, given 
these inputs is referred to as x-efficiency. Conventional economics assumes x-effi-
ciency dominates in the long run.
X-inefficiency is assumed away by the conventional economic modeling of the 
firm. But x-efficiency very much depends on the choices made within the black box 
of the firm. Conventional economics assumes that the choices made are consistent 
with x-efficiency. However, this need not be the case. I argue, unlike in the conven-
tional modeling of the firm, that there is no guarantee that x-efficient choices will be 
the norm. Moreover, smart or rational agents can be expected to make choices that 
will result in the firm being x-inefficient.
The x-inefficiency is part of the behavioural economics methodological narrative 
pioneered by Simon (1959, 1978, 1986, 1987). Generally speaking, behavioural eco-
nomics argues for modelling assumptions that align with the facts and theoretical 
narratives that build upon how individuals or economic agents make decisions in 
the real world. It challenges the conventional economics assumption that individuals 
tend, even in the long run, to behave in accordance to conventional or neoclassical 
behavioural norms.
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A critical and general methodological point raised by behavioural economists 
is the importance of determining benchmarks for best-practice choice behaviour 
of individuals in a variety of decision-making environments. Most recent attention 
has been directed to the choices of consumers and households and the psychologi-
cal, sociological and institutional determinants of these choices; with some discus-
sion on the neurological determinants. Little emphasis has been directed on choices 
made inside the firm, which has significant effects on the level of material well-
being achievable in a society. The great methodological debate relates to whether 
general ‘neoclassical’ benchmarks are optimal (and assumed achievable by reality-
based decision-makers) or whether alternative benchmarks make more sense. In the 
heuristics and biases approach to behavioural economics (Kahneman 2003; Kahne-
man and Tversky 1979; Thaler and Sunstein 2008; Tversky and Kahneman 1981), 
humans tend not to meet achievable optimal neoclassical benchmarks and therefore 
make suboptimal choices. This is often a product of using heuristics or decision-
making shortcuts. In the alternative fast and frugal approach, alternative optimal 
benchmarks are and should be adopted, based on context specific heuristics. This 
evolutionary approach to the use of heuristics is referred to as ecological rational-
ity (for an early rendition of this see, March 1978). This can take the form of fast 
and frugal heuristics (Gigerenzer 2007; Mousavi et  al. 2017; Mousavi 2018). Or, 
more broadly, it can take the form of heuristics that are frugal but not necessarily 
fast (slow thinking) (Kahneman 2011).1 This is very much in contrast to heuristics 
and biases approach where heuristics yield sub-optimal choices and outcomes.
Following from some of the key points articulated in x-efficiency theory, we 
argue that firms are efficient only if firm decision-makers choose to behave in a 
manner consistent with maximizing productivity given the traditional inputs at hand. 
However, such behaviour takes place only under a specific incentive environment 
and typically also requires particular preferences by firm decision-makers. It is not a 
matter of firms simply attempting to maximize profits as per conventional econom-
ics or adopting fast and frugal heuristics in the place of profit maximization. If prof-
its are being maximized, it becomes a matter of how profits are being maximized. 
The how is not addressed in the conventional narrative and the same is the case with 
the fast and frugal narrative with regards to the organizational structure of the firm 
and the embedded incentive environment.
We argue that economic efficiency is achieved when firms adopt heuristics that 
are nuanced to the particular circumstances of the firm, where these may not be con-
sistent with neoclassical behavioural norms, for example. This type of smart deci-
sion-making, more in line with ‘satisficing’ behaviour (which one can refer to as fru-
gal or simple or simplified heuristics), is context dependent and contributes towards 
1 Kahneman’s (2011) now recognizes the possibility that under certain circumstances fast and frugal 
heuristics (fast thinking) will yield superior outcomes than proxies to conventional economic norms 
(slow thinking). From the perspective of this article, slow thinking can also be a non-conventional heu-
ristic that is fit for purpose. And a slow thinking heuristic might form the basis for an informed fast and 
frugal heuristic. This is similar to the reality that efficient intuition (fast thinking) based decisions are 
drawn on prior experience (slow thinking) on oneself or others. The latter often incorporated in social 
norms, habits, and traditions.
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achieving economic efficiency. In this context, fast and frugal heuristics, can yield 
higher levels of x-efficiency than following neoclassical behavioural norms. But 
blindly following any particular set of theoretical norms to achieve efficiency can be 
predicted to yield sub-optimal economic outcomes. Using heuristics as opposed to 
neoclassical behavioural norms is only one component of the economic efficiency 
narrative. Economic efficiency also critically depends on the preferences of deci-
sion-making, the firm’s state of industrial relations, the organizational form of the 
firm, as well as market forces.
1.1  Optimal, economic efficient behaviour
Optimal behaviour is considered to be behaviour which achieves economic effi-
ciency or x-efficiency in production. What this, in effect, means is that firm mem-
bers are working as smart and as hard as they can (maximizing effort inputs), given 
the totality of traditional factor inputs. This ‘ideal’ scenario is what Leibenstein 
(1966) refers to as x-efficiency in production. Conventional economics assumes that 
firm members (economic agents) are maximizing effort inputs at all times. Market 
forces ensure this outcome which can be reinforced by the assumed aligned profit 
maximizing preferences of firm members (Altman 1999; Friedman 1953). Hence, 
problems with firms’ performance are not scrutinized in terms of potential organiza-
tional, power, or preference related issues inside of the black box of the firm (Cyert 
and March 1963; Tong 2020).
The conventional economic wisdom does not strictly specify how economic effi-
ciency is achieved, but it does relate closely to profit maximizing behaviour and 
related intensive no cost or very low cost information search behaviour as well as 
detailed marginal calculations. And it is assumed that economic agents actually 
behave in this manner or it is assumed that they behave as if they are engaging in 
such profit maximizing behaviour (Berg and Gigerenzer 2010; Friedman 1953). In 
this modeling framework there is no analysis of how firms are actually run as func-
tioning and successful economic entities. In reality, no successful firm’s members 
invest their time and effort engaged in intensive marginal calculations combined 
with intensive information search activities. They engage in different and varied 
activities to make their firms successful (Cyert and March 1963; Frantz 1997; Gor-
don 1996; Lazonick 1991 Leibenstein 1966, 1979; Levine and Tyson 1990; Penrose 
1959; Sheffrin 2008; Tong 2020).
In the heuristics and biases approach to behavioural economics pioneered by 
Kahneman and Tversky the optimal normative behavioural benchmark is the one 
identified in conventional ‘neoclassical economics’. Deviations for this decision-
making behavioural norm is thought to be yield sub-optimal choices which reduce 
the decision-makers’ welfare from what it could otherwise be. Although Kahne-
man and Tversky’s focus was not on firm behaviour, it logically follows from their 
argument that such deviant sub-optimal behavioural will result in lower levels of 
economic welfare (lower levels of GDP per person, for example). Critical to this 
approach is the assumption (backed up with evidence largely from experiments on 
consumer behaviour) that decision-makers tend to deviate, often persistently (no or 
1 3
Implications of smart decision-making and heuristics for…
little Bayesian updating) from neoclassical behavioural norms (Kahneman 2003, 
2011; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Thaler 2015).
Individuals tend not to behave neoclassically. This is a fundamentally impor-
tant finding as it undermines the conventional economics assumption that not only 
should economic agents behave neoclassically, but they actually do. This point is 
reiterated by Smith (2003, 2006), who maintains that such deviations from neoclas-
sical norms represent rational and optimal behaviour from the perspective of firm 
performance.
What are the implications of ecological rationality and fast and frugal heuristics 
in the context of x-efficiency theory for production theory and our understanding of 
material welfare? I argue that they suggest alternatives to the neoclassical produc-
tion function and that the neoclassical production function per se yields a mislead-
ing benchmark of what is maximum (efficient) output. Building upon the insights 
from behavioural economics, I present an alternative, more realistic and analytically 
precise specification of the production function which I referred to as the Satisfic-
ing, Boundedly Rational and Smart Fast and Frugal, X-Efficient production function 
or SAXE. The latter incorporates an understanding of the appropriate procedures, 
organization variables and end-goals required to achieve optimality in the realm of 
production.
Satisficing (developed by Simon 1978, 1987) refers to doing the best one can, 
given one’s decision-making capabilities and the decision-making environment. 
This is opposed to the conventional economics concept of maximizing. Bounded 
rationality (also developed by Simon 1978, 1987) refers to rational or smart 
behaviour that is fit for purpose. It is behaviour suited to one’s decision-making 
capabilities and environment. And, bounded rationality invariably involves the 
development and use of heuristics or decision-making shortcuts. Fast and frugal 
(Gigerenzer 2007) refers to heuristics that are minimalist and quickly executed, 
potentially generating savings in time and money. Smart fast and frugal heuristics 
makes reference to such heuristics that are well thought out and fit for purpose 
and relates to Simon’s concept of procedural rationality. This alternative specifi-
cation of the production function is ecologically rational in that it evolves based 
on decision-makers’ capabilities and their decision-making environment (related 
to bounded rationality). But this does not entirely dismiss neoclassical specifica-
tions, specifically that efficiency requires that output is maximized given tradi-
tional factor inputs. Rather, it places the neoclassical specification of efficiency in 
the context of bounded rationality. Conventional theory simply assumes that the 
rational firm (its agents) will make decisions abiding by conventional behavioural 
norms (or behaving as if they do) to achieve economic efficiency, de facto x-effi-
ciency. The SAXE specification, makes no such assumption. Conventional norms 
are not assumed to be ideal or even achievable. Although output maximization is 
required to achieve x-efficiency, it is understood that the means to do so are com-
plex and context dependent. X-efficiency is not guaranteed by assumption. It is 
achieved only when appropriate context dependent behavioural norms are devel-
oped and adhered to within a facilitating institutional environment.
The neoclassical assumption of the necessary conditions (such as effort ‘maxi-
mization’) that need be met for economic efficiency to be realized is an important 
 M. Altman 
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one. But the neoclassical necessary conditions are often mis-specified or not 
specified; they are implicitly assumed. A critical contribution of neoclassical 
methodology is to underline that there are objectively determinable standards for 
production efficiency to be achieved and for individual utility to be maximized. 
Not all behaviours can be deemed efficient or utility enhancing. However, I also 
argue that the neoclassical normative argument that individuals behave in a man-
ner consistent with economic efficiency is highly misleading.
I also make the case that rational choice behaviour can deviate significantly 
from benchmark efficient behaviour. Individual or group (firm) based rational 
choice behaviour can result in rational inefficiency in the domain of produc-
tion. Inefficient choice is not equivalent to lacking in intelligence (Altman 2017). 
Rationality is consistent with both efficiency and inefficiency in production. 
I argue that “ecological rationality” need not be economically efficient (can be 
x-inefficient). An important component of my discourse is the argument that pro-
duction efficiency is not always consistent with neoclassical norms. Moreover, 
production efficiency is critically dependent upon the incentive cum institutional 
environment faced by economic agents within the firm. This takes us beyond 
a discourse on heuristics and decision-making. Economic efficiency requires 
the realization of specific institutional norms (related to firm governance). The 
‘right’ institutional framework need not be in place, yielding rational production 
inefficiencies.
1.2  Neoclassical norms, heuristics and economic efficiency
Conventional theory assumes that rational agents produce efficiently by minimizing 
costs and maximizing profits. It is further implicitly assumed that economic agents 
behave in a manner consistent with effort maximization. Economic agents of the 
firm behave as if they are all characterized by such behavioural arguments. Such 
efficiency enhancing behaviour is enforced through the survival principle. Inefficient 
firms are eliminated in the long run by the competitive process (Friedman 1953).
Consistent with x-efficiency theory and the related evidence, I argue that conven-
tional economics incorrectly assumes that all agents maximize effort inputs, which 
is fundamental to generate production efficiency (Frantz 1997; Leibenstein 1966; 
Tong 2020). This incorrect behavioural assumption is reinforced by the incorrect 
institutional assumption of perfect or highly competitive product markets. But if one 
assumes that neoclassical behavioural assumptions prevail, one assumes that firms 
are always operating along their respective optimal production possibility frontiers 
(PPFs) whereas they might very well be operating in the interior of their PPFs.
Following the findings of fast and frugal heuristics research, I also argue that eco-
nomic agents using clearly non neoclassical methods (fast and frugal heuristics) can 
yield superior results. Hence, such heuristic behaviour facilitates achieving higher 
levels of effort input required to realize production efficiency. But note that heu-
ristics need not always be ‘fast’; they can involve slow thinking (Kahneman 2011). 
Given that effort is a scarce resource, what one can argue from the fast and frugal 
approach is that adopting a heuristics approach to decision-making saves this scarce 
effort resource as compared to what would transpire if neoclassical behavioural 
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norms are adopted. The accumulated effort savings could then, potentially, be used 
to invest in increasing firm productivity thereby increasing its level of x-efficiency. 
Moreover, adopting fast and frugal heuristics need not sacrifice on the overall effi-
ciency of choice outcomes with regards, for example, the operation of the shop floor 
or investment decisions.2
This point is illustrated in Fig. 1, where effort input is on the vertical axis and 
productivity is on the horizonal. Line 0  k represents conventional behavioural 
norms, whilst 0 g represents heuristics based behavioural norms incorporating fast 
and frugal heuristics. 0 g yields higher levels of productivity than does 0 k—0f pro-
ductivity compared to 0d. 0 g (heuristics) represents a more efficient use of effort. 
Looked at from an effort-use perspective, heuristics requires less effort (0b) to yield 
a given level of productivity (0d) than conventional behavioural norms (0a). In this 
scenario, maximum effort is given by 0 m, where conventional norms yield a much 
lower level of productivity (0f) than what could be generated using heuristics in the 
decision-making process. This level of productivity requires a much lower level of 
effort (0 m). The surplus effort could be invested in generating a higher level of pro-
ductivity. But the savings in effort need not be invested to increase productivity or 
the level of x-efficiency. Much depends on the preferences of firm members, how the 
firm is organized, and market forces.
Therefore, unlike with the heuristics and biases approach to behavioural econom-
ics neoclassical behavioural norms should not be the benchmark by which to meas-
ure optimal behaviour. One cannot assume a priori that efforts to maximize profits or 
minimize costs will yield economic efficiency irrespective of the processes adopted 
to realize this end. But this does not vitiate the critical point made in conventional 
Eff
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a
c d f
g
h
0
Convenonal norms
Heuriscs
km
Using heuriscs saves on scarce effort 
resources, that can be invested to 
increase firm producvity
Fig. 1  Effort, decision-making norms and labour productivity
2 Gigerenzer’s (2007) point of focus is the realm of consumer related decision making, but this can be 
extended to the realm of production and the theory of the firm.
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economics that effort maximization is an essential determinant of economic or 
x-efficiency. The simple point made here is that neoclassical behavioural norms can-
not be expected to yield economic efficiency. The type of decision-making norms 
one adopts critically affects the firm’s level of x-efficiency by impacting on the effi-
ciency by which scarce effort resources are employed.
This narrative yields the hypothesis that non-neoclassical (SAXE) heuristic based 
behavioural norms, in an appropriate institutional environment, can yield higher 
levels of productivity generating higher levels of x-efficiency. This hypothesis is 
reinforced by the experimental work of Smith (2005, 149). Smith concludes (2005, 
149–150):
It is shown that the investor who chooses to maximize expected profit (dis-
counted total withdrawals) fails in finite time. Moreover, there exist a variety 
of nonprofit-maximizing behaviors that have a positive probability of never 
failing. In fact it is shown that firms that maximize profits are the least likely 
to be the market survivors. My point is simple: when experimental results are 
contrary to standard concepts of rationality, assume not just that people are 
irrational, but that you may not have the right model of rational behavior. Lis-
ten to what your subjects may be trying to tell you. Think of it this way. If you 
could choose your ancestors, would you want them to be survivalists or to be 
expected wealth maximizers?
This SAXE approach to the theory of the firm has implications for one common 
interpretation of bounded rationality theory, which infers that boundedly rational 
behaviour yields sub-optimal decisions since bounded rationality imposes a con-
straint on rational (‘unboundedly’ rational) neoclassical behaviour (Conlisk 1996). 
Being boundedly rational results in firms performing in the interior of their produc-
tion possibility frontier. In this approach the neoclassical narrative is retained. The 
benchmark for optimality is the neoclassical norm. But from the SAXE approach, 
bounded rationality simply implies that we live in a non-neoclassical world and 
that this affects the decisions that rational-smart decision-makers make. And, these 
rational decisions, in a world of bounded rationality, can’t be the same as what might 
transpire in a neoclassical world. Heuristics can, therefore, yield better decisions and 
better outcomes (higher levels of x-efficiency) that can be achieved by abiding by 
neoclassical behavioural norms.
This point elaborated with regards to fast and frugal heuristics specifically, by 
Todd and Gigerenzer (2003, 160–161):
Studying ecological rationality enables us to go beyond the widespread fic-
tion that basing decision making on more information and computation will 
always lead to more accurate inferences. There is a point at which increasing 
information and information processing can actually do harm…there are cases 
where cognitive limitations actually seem to be beneficial, enabling new func-
tions that would be absent without them, rather than constraining the possible 
behaviors of the system… given that cognitive capacities are free parameters 
that have been adjusted in the course of evolution, the ability to use simple 
heuristics may have required the evolution of no more than a certain limited 
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amount of cognitive capacity necessary to execute those heuristics. This argu-
ment requires that simple heuristics had a selective advantage over more com-
plex cognitive strategies (which would have required more processing power). 
But we have already seen that such advantages do exist, in terms of speed and 
robustness and enabling new functionality. Thus, the benefits of simple limited 
decision mechanisms may actually partly underlie the emergence of bounded 
rationality itself.
A key point made in this ecological rationality narrative is that given the cogni-
tive wiring of the decision makers and information imperfections the standard for 
unbiased behaviour often should not be neoclassical norms. What often appears to 
be an error or bias using neoclassical norms may in fact be a form of optimal behav-
iour. Neoclassical behaviour would be irrational or biased here. And, therefore, neo-
classical behavioural norms should not be used as the norm for optimal behaviour.
But the rational use of heuristics need not yield x-efficiency in production. 
The appropriate heuristics need be chosen to elicit economic efficiency or x-effi-
ciency. Being fast and frugal need not translate into being x-efficient. Much criti-
cally depends upon the heuristics adopted inside of the firm and related institutional 
environment. An important point made by Simon (1987) and Leibenstein (1966) is 
that firm decision-makers attempt to maximize (or satisfice) in terms of their pref-
erences. But satisficing behaviour, although rational and utility maximizing, need 
not be consistent with generating economic efficiency. And such utility maximizing 
behaviour can persist if relatively x-inefficient firms are somehow protected from 
market forces. Therefore, sub-optimal heuristics (behavioural norms) can persist 
given appropriate environment conditions (Altman 1999). In this case, even adopt-
ing non-neoclassical norms can result in the firm operating in the interior of its pro-
duction possibility frontier. And we have here a case of rational inefficiency (Altman 
2005, 2006, 2017). Ecological rationality is consistent with both rational inefficiency 
an x-efficiency in production.
1.3  Implications of x‑efficiency theory and fast and frugal heuristics for the PPF
X-efficient production results from best practice management practices, preferences 
of decision-makers, the manner in which the firm is organized, and market forces. 
It takes a micro perspective on firm decision-making and organization and is con-
sistent with the notion of bounded and ecological rationality as well as with smart 
and rational decision-making (Frantz 1997; Leibenstein 1966, 1979). When a firm 
is x-inefficient its production possibility frontier lies in the interior of the x-efficient 
PPF (Altman 2005, 2006). If x-inefficiency is assumed away, as it is in conventional 
or neoclassical theory, then the revealed production possibility frontier is assumed 
to be the optimal x-efficient PPF. Following upon a SAXE narrative, attempting to 
achieve x-efficiency by applying simplistic neoclassical behavioural norms to the 
firm embedded in the real world of bounded rationality would be one sure method of 
assuring firm underperformance and, therefore, x-inefficiency in production.
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In the original x-inefficiency model (Leibenstein 1966), x-inefficiency results in 
higher unit production costs since managerial decisions in and of themselves result 
in lower effort inputs and, therefore, lower levels of productivity. This can be illus-
trated in a one factor input model of the firm, where w is unit labor costs (a proxy for 
all labour costs), Q is output, and L is labor input:
Average cost increases as labour productivity falls as a function of a reduction 
in effort inputs. In this case x-inefficient firms survive only if all firms are equally 
x-inefficient or if they are protected from competitive pressures.
If the level of x-efficiency is contingent upon the costs of labor inputs, such as 
incentives to labor and management, different levels of x-inefficiency can be bal-
anced by countervailing differences in production costs. Relatively x-efficient firms 
would be characterized by the same average costs as x-inefficient firms. In this case, 
x-inefficient firms can survive even in the face competitive product markets. In 
Eq. 1, changes in w can be neutralized by changes in productivity. This is important 
to note since firms need not be economically efficient to survive on the market even 
when product markets are relatively competitive since x-inefficiency need not gener-
ate higher average costs.
From the fast and frugal narrative, one would hypothesize that neoclassical 
behaviour will yield a lower level of output than is feasible—one would be in the 
interior of the production possibility frontier. Based on our modeling above, fast 
and frugal heuristics, which can be removed from optimal neoclassical behaviour, 
should yield higher levels of productivity, higher levels of x-efficiency than neoclas-
sical norms. The fast and frugal production possibility frontier would, therefore, lie 
above the neoclassical PPF.
However, there might be an array of non-neoclassical behavioural norms and 
parameters that yield x-efficiency in production. Specifying what they are, requires 
a nuanced understanding of the firm and its current institutional and market context. 
For example, x-efficiency in production might require frugal heuristics, efforts to 
minimize moral hazard, and more fairness introduced into the incentive environment 
of the firm. A production possibility frontier based on this more holistic approach to 
the firm (going beyond, but incorporating the insights from the fast and frugal narra-
tive) could reflect an even higher level of x-efficiency and should, therefore, lie even 
above the fast and frugal PPF. Which decision-making norms firm members adopts, 
however, plays an important role in explaining a firm’s level of x-efficiency.
Some of these points are illustrated in Fig. 2. If the neoclassical or conventional 
behavioural norms is the benchmark for achieving optimal firm performance, given 
by PPF CONXI (conventional norms-x-inefficiency), then the heuristics and biases 
narrative suggests that the human preference for heuristics yield a PPF, H&B, below 
CONXI reflecting a lower level of productivity and a higher level of x-inefficiency. 
The fast and frugal narrative suggests a superior PPF given by the Heuristics PPF. 
Therefore, the conventional PPF, CONXI, reflects x-inefficiency in production not 
(1)
AC =
w(
Q
L
)
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economic efficiency as typically assumed. Going beyond the important heuristics 
narrative, adding a more appropriate decision-making environment and decision-
maker preferences into the decision-making mix yields an even higher PPF given by 
SAXE, the Satisficing Boundedly Rational and Smart Fast and Frugal, X-Efficient 
production function.
Applying neoclassical behavioural norms and ignoring the intricacies of firm 
decision-making in the real world of bounded rationality would be expected to shift 
the firm’s production possibility frontier inward as it engenders an inefficient use of 
scarce effort resources in the decision-making process, thereby reducing output per 
unit of factor input. This pushes the firm further from its potential of producing at 
economic or x-efficiency.
2  Conclusion
This article integrates the concepts of x-efficiency, bounded rationality, and fast and 
frugal heuristics as they relate to economic efficiency. This requires that one recog-
nizes the importance of conventional economics’ emphasis on what is technically 
required to achieve economic efficiency. This relates to the notion that economic 
efficiency requires that effort inputs (quality and quantity dimensions) are some-
how maximized. But the conventional wisdom assumes that effort maximization is 
a given. And, it does not discuss how economic efficiency can be realized apart from 
assuming that it is achieved through a focus on profit maximization. But this concept 
is too narrow to provide any substance to an explanation of how economic efficiency 
can actually be achieved within the firm.
The bounded rationality approach to human behaviour maintains that in the real 
world, smart, intelligent, rational economic agents cannot and will not behave in 
accordance to conventional or neoclassical behavioural norms. The fast and frugal 
heuristics approach suggests that decision-making outcomes are superior when non-
conventional norms are evolved and put into practice. This is in stark contrast to the 
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heuristics and biases approach that maintains that because economic agents don’t 
and can’t abide by conventional norms their decision-making outcomes will be sub-
optimal. In this context, I argue that heuristics can generate superior productivity 
outcomes by saving on scarce effort resources and generating more effective and 
efficient outcomes, contributing to higher levels of economic or x-efficiency thereby 
increasing society’s level of material welfare. In contrast, conventional behavioural 
norms waste scarce effort resources yielding lower levels of x-efficiency. Therefore, 
conventional or neoclassical behavioural norms should not be used as the baseline 
to measure optimal efficiency and bounded rationality need not yield sub-optimal 
economic behaviour. This is an important analytical prediction that is clearly dif-
ferentiated from what flows from the conventional wisdom and from the heuristics 
and biases perspective in behavioural economics. It forces us to take a much more 
nuanced and reality-based perspective on what is required both inside the firm and 
with regards to institutional parameters to facilitate and incentivize the realization of 
x-efficiency.
However, we should not assume that economic efficiency is achieved simply as 
a function of economic agents adopting heuristics to engage in decision-making 
inside of the firm. Such an assumption would be little different from the neoclassi-
cal assumption that production efficiency is always achieved by way of the survival 
principle. The smart-rational choices of economic agents need not be optimal even 
given the fast and frugal narrative. Appropriate heuristics need be adopted depend-
ing on circumstances. The heuristics narrative requires more specificity. Moreover, 
the important positive heuristics narrative is only part of the economic efficiency 
puzzle. Achieving economic efficiency requires not only adopting appropriate con-
text-dependent heuristics, but also adopting the appropriate organization forms and 
information environment that generate the incentives to facilitate x-efficiency in pro-
duction. This represents a more holistic, behavioural, approach to a theory of the 
firm, incorporating a more prescient understanding of optimal decision-making pro-
cesses and of the firm’s overall decision-making environment and the overarching 
preferences of the firm’s decision-makers.
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tional License (http://creat iveco mmons .org/licen ses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, 
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